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TORT LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL
NONFEASANCE*
A. M. LINDEN t
Toronto
1 . Introduction.
The common law has treated the Good Samaritan with uncommon
harshness over the years, while the priest and the Levite have been
treated with uncommon generosity.' One who attempts in good
faith to assist someone in peril exposes himself to potential civil
liability in the event of his negligence, but one who stands idly
by without lifting a finger incurs no liability, although the latter
conduct is probably more reprehensible and more deserving of
a civil sanction.' First year law students are normally horrified
to learn that the common law does not require one to rescue a
drowning man, 3 that one need not warn ablindmanwho is stepping
in front of a moving automobile,4 and that there is no duty to
prevent someone from walking into the mouth of a dangerous
machine.' They are no less shocked when they discover that
doctors, who faithfully subscribe to the glorious Hippocratic Oath,
are not subjected to civil liability if they hypocritically refuse to
attend on a dying patient.' Nor does the common law require one
to feed the starving, to bind up the wounds of those who are bleed-
*This article is based on a paper prepared under the helpful supervision
of Professor John G. Fleming at the University of California at Berkeley,
in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
the Science of Jurisprudence .
tA . M . Linden, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
"See generally, Prosser, The Law of Torts, (3rd ed., 1964), p. 334 ;
Fleming, The Law of Torts (3rd ed., 1965), p . 145 ; 2 Harper and James,
The Law of Torts (1956), p . 1044 .
2 Prosser, op . cit., ihid., p . 339 ; Ames, Law and Morals (1908), 22 Harv.
L. Rev . 97, 112, Reprinted in Selected Essays on The Law of Torts (1924),
p . 13 ; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others As A Basis of Tort Liabitity
(1908), 56 U . Pa . L . Rev . 217, 316.
3 Osterlind v. Hill (1928), 263 Mass . 73, 160 N.E. 301 .
4 The Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934), §314, Illustration 1 .
5 Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co. (1897), 69 N.H . 257, 44 Att . 809 ;
Gautret v . Egertok (1867), L.R . 2 C.P . 371 .
6 Hurley v . Edingfield (1901), 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E . 1058 .
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ing to death, 7 nor to prevent a child from engaging in dangerous
conduct.8
The common law has acknowledged on occasion that "the
impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of the most
beneficial instincts of humanity" 9 and that "to protect those who
are not able to protect themselves is a duty which everyone owes
to society", 10 but on the question of civil liability it has adopted
a hands-off policy . The regulation of this type of conduct has been
assigned to the "higher law" and to the "voice of conscience"
both of which would appear singularly ineffective either to prevent
the harm or to compensate the victim." The common law courts
have resisted the creation of a general civil obligation to render
assistance to individuals in danger, although in several European
countries such a duty has been imposed. 12
The ethical and religious precepts of Western civilization have
had more influence upon legislatures which have enacted various
types of criminal or quasi-criminal legislation requiring certain
affirmative conduct." The legislative commandments may be
decreed by statute, regulation or order in council, or municipal
ordinance and their breach is normally punishable by fine, im-
prisonment or other sanctions." One of the most prevalent pieces
of this type of legislation is the "hit and run statute". Where the
driver of a motor vehicle is involved in a collision, he is required to
stop, to give his name and address and "to render all possible
assistance" whether he was at fault for the accident or not." Failure
to comply is punishable by fine, imprisonment and other sanctions .
Legislation which penalizes the owner of a motor vehicle who fails
to insure against public liability is becoming increasingly common.16
The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that sufficient funds will
be available to satisfy any tort judgment secured by a third person
against the owner of a motor vehicle that is involved in an accident .
7 Allen v. Hi.yson (1900), 111 Ga. 460,36 S.E. 810.
5 Sidwell v . Alc Vay (1955), 282 P . 2d 756 (Okl) .'Scaramanga v. Stamp (1880),5 C.P.D . 295, at p. 304 (Cockburn C.J .),
cited in Love v. New Fairview (1904), 10 B.C.R . 330 (C.A .) .
Jenoure v. Demege, [1891] A.C. 73, at p . 77 .
Prosser, op. cit., footnote 1, p . 336 .
12 Dawson, Negotiorurn Gestio : The Altruistic Intermeddler (1961),
74 Harv. L . Rev. 1073, at p . 1105 ; Failure to Rescue : A Comparative
Study (1952), 52 Col . L . Rev. 631 .
11 See infra. 14 See infra.
11 See, for example, Ontario Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 172,
s . 143a and California Vehicle Code (1959), §20001, 20003, 20004 .
16 In the United Kingdom, Road Traffic Act (1930), 20 & 21 Geo. 5,
c. 43, s . 35(l) ; In Massachussetts, Mass . Ann . Laws, c . 90 ; In New York,
N.Y . Vehicle and Traffic Law, §310 ; In North Carolina, N. C. Sess. Laws
of 1957, c. 1393.
19661
	
Tort Liabilityfor Criminal Nonfeasance 27
Municipal ordinances frequently require abutting owners to keep
the public sidewalk bordering their property free and clear of ice
and snow under threat of criminal prosecution.17 Nor is it un-
common to find statutes that -require individuals to assist a police
officer in the apprehension of a criminal if so requiredI 8 and to
supply food, clothing and medical assistance to near relatives,"
and other such legislation. 21 Thus, nonfeasance may amount to
a crime.
The purpose of this article is to examine the impact of this
criminal legislation on the common law of tort in order to dis-
cover whether tort- law has followed the criminal law, as in days
gone by equity followed the common law., or whether tort law has
remained aloof from pollution by these criminal laws . This article
will try to bring into focus the influence of criminal legislation in
the creation of new tort duties where at common law no duty
existed. No attempt will be made to analyze the influence of
criminal legislation on tort liability where there is already a com-
mon law duty in existence . Discussions of the doctrines of neg-
ligence per se, prima facie negligence and the evidence of neg-
ligence rules will be left to others," although any discussion of
tort liability for criminal nonfeasance cannot avoid them com-.pletely.
Some writers have denounced as "notorious" 22 and "improp-
er" 11 any judicial use of criminal legislation to create new tort
duties,24 others have defended such action," and a good number
of writers and courts generally have not distinguished between
the use of criminal legislation where a common law duty is already
17 For example, see Halifax by-law in Commerford v. Board of School
Commissioners, [1950] 2 D .L.R . 207 (N.S.S.C .) .
18 See Criminal Code of Canada, S . C ., 1953-54, c. 57 as am., s . 110(b) .
19 Ibid., s . 186(l), (2) ; Children's Maintenance Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 55,
s . I . ; California Penal Code, § 270 .
Il Seo infra.
21 Alexander, Legislation and The Standard of Care in Negligence
(1964), 42 Can . Bar Rev . 243 ; Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action
(1914), 27 Harv. L . Rev . 317 ; Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions (1949), 49 Col . L. Rev. 21 ; Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation (1932), 16 Minn . L. Rev. 361 ; Gregory,
Breach of Criminal Licensing Statutes in Civil Litigation (1951), 36 Cornell
L . Q . 622 ; Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in The Law of Tort
(1960), 23 Mod. L. Rev. 233 ; Fricke, The Juridical Nat-are of The Action
Upon The Statute (1960), 76 L. Q. Rev . 240 .
22 Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 130, footnote 23 .
21 Williams, loc. cit ., footnote 21, at p. 259 . -
24 Gregory l' loc. cit., ibid., and Thayer, loc. cit., !bid., strongly opposedthis type of judicial use of legislation .
21, Morris, loc. cit ., ibid. ; See also Morris, Studies in The Law of Torts
~1952), p . 141 .
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in existence and where no common law duty has been recogniz-
ed." In their treatment of this problem, the common law courts
have been forced to grapple with the ancient dichotomy of
misfeasance and nonfeasance; they have insisted upon a quest
for a non-existent legislative intention that has hampered the
articulation of rational guidelines ; they have been drawn into a
discussion of causation, proximate cause, the scope of the risk and
many of the other problems that have plagued the courts in their
treatment of legislation . The courts have perpetuated unnecessarily
the confusion which surrounds this area by their refusal to discuss
candidly the conflicting policies to be resolved . This article will
attempt to demonstrate that the courts have on some occasions
created new civil duties of care by analogy to the criminal legislation
where they were sympathetic to the legislative objects. On other
occasions, where they were apathetic to the legislative policy, they
have refused to impose civil liability for criminal nonfeasance .
11 . Nonfeasance and Misfeasance : History and Policy.
The great Bohlen has written"V that "there is no distinction more
deeply rooted in the common law than that between misfeasance
and nonfeasance, between active misconduct working positive
injury to others and passive inaction . . ." . He contended that re-
quirements of positive action are "exceptional" and "abnormal" . 28
This distinction, although admitted to be a difficult one to draw
in practice 2l is defended by some writers" and judges 3 l and is
attacked by others .32 Nevertheless, one large fact remains : courts
do apply different standards to cases of inaction than they do to
cases of positive action.
Historically, it is contended that the King's courts did not wish
to concern themselves with the supervision of acts of omission
since they encountered sufficient difficulties in their regulation of the
21 For example, Fricke, op . cit., ibid. ; Salmond, Torts (12th ed ., 1957),
p . 467 ; Charlesworth, Negligence (4th ed ., 1962), p . 951 .
27 Bohlen, loc. cit ., footnote 2, at p . 219 .
28 Ibid., at p . 221 .
29 Ibid. ; see also, Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 335 ; Fleming, o'u. cit .,
footnote 1, p . 146 .
30 Wright, Negligent "Acts or Omissions" (1941), 19 Can . Bar Rev.
465, at p. 473 ; Thayer, loc . cit., footnote 21 ; See also, Wasney v . Jurazsk~ ,
(1933),41 Man. R. 46,[193311 W.W.R . 155 (C.A .) relying on Thayer.
See East SuffOlk Catchment Board v . Kent, [19411 A.C . 74 .
Morris, loc . cit., footnote 21 ; Wright, loc. cit., footnote 30 ; See,
Vancouver v. McPhalen (1911), 45 S.C.R . 194, where Justice Idington
said : ". . . the sooner the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance .
. . . is discarded, the better."
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more flagrant positive aggresSion§. 33 Only when someone volun-
tarily undertook an obligation by entering into some relation-
ship with another, did the courts require the individual to take
care . Thus, in cases of gratuitous bailment, for example, the courts
created a positive duty of care toward the bailor .14
No legal doctrine can long survive because of historical reasons
alone in the absence of a current policy base. Several policy reasons
are advanced in support of the nonfeasance principles . The com-
monlaw is said to promote rugged individualism and the indepen-
dence of mankind.35 People who live in common law countries
should be self-sufficient and shun dependency on others. How-
ever, to call for help in time of distress is the natural reaction of
even the most independent of men, and such conduct is not crit-
icized, although it might be if there were no distress. It is sug-
gested that independence in time of danger is not necessarily a
virtue and that by insisting upon this the common law seeks to
do too much in the way of the enforcement of individualism."
Although we have seen the gradual eclipse in large measure of
the rugged individualism of an earlier era by legislative enactment
requiring positive conduct, the common law courts have clung
steadfastly to the ancient distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. Statutes have been passed which require individuals
under threat of criminal prosecution to serve their country in time
of war and peace, to pay income taxes and to file tax returns, to
disclose certain political affiliations and certain financial dealings,
to insure themselves against penury and disability in old age and
against the inabilitylto pay for medical serviceS .37 But the common
law courts continue to declare that there is no civil liability for
simple nonfeasance.
It has been said that the common law should not enforce un-
selfishness by making one man serve his fellows's since this is too
great an infringement of personal liberty which smacks of slavery
or socialiSM .39 Similarly it is contended that the courts should
33 Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 1, p. 334 ; Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 1,
p . 145 .34 13ohlen, loc. cit., footnote 2, at p . 316 .
31 Harper and James, op. cit., footnote 1, p . 1046 ; Prosser, op . cit .,
footnote 1, p . 334 ; McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort(1949), 58 Yale L . J. 1272, at p . 1288 ; Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combina-
tion and Nonfeasance (1946), 46 Col. L . Rev . 198, at p . 213 .
36 Hale, loc. cit., ibid., at p . 213 .
37 Snyder, Liability for Negative Conduct (1949), 35 Va. L. Rev. 446 .
1 1 Harper and James, op. cit ., footnote 1, p . 1049 .
11 See, Minor, Moral Obligation as A Basis of Liability (1923), 9 Va .
L . Rev. 421, at p . 422 .
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not enforce morality, but that this task should be left to one's own
conscience .40 Let a man be branded as a "moral monster" 41 by
his fellow men or by his church, but the common law will not
be made into "an instrument to enforce general unselfishness" . 42,
Whereas the court will not hesitate to regulate positive conduct
that injures others, it is averse to require positive action from one
who merely refrains from assisting another .43 Underlying all of
this is the notion that the proper function of the common law is
to prevent men from harming one another rather than to require
men to confer benefits upon one another merely because they are
both human beings .44
The common law has hesitated to require one to expose him-
self to danger in order to assist someone else .41 There is a tendency
to sympathize with the individual who, for fear of his own safety,
fails to leap upon the armed attacker of a complete stranger .
Most people are not made that way and the common law wisely
recognizes this fact. Part of the explanation for this judicial ret-
icence may be attributable to the unavailability in the past of
compensation for the heroic rescuer. Until recently, one who was
injured in the course of a rescue operation was deprived of com-
pensation because he was said to have voluntarily assumed the
risk of his injury or because he was said to be the cause of his own
misfortune.46 This impediment has now been removed ; rescuers.
are able to recover from anyone who negligently places another in
a position of danger which invites rescue,41 and from an individual
who places himself in a position of danger. 48 This is also the case
where the rescuer is injured by the supervening negligence of a
10 Ames, loc. cit ., footnote 2.
41 See, Bitch v . Amory, supra, footnote 5 .
12 Hale, loc. cit ., footnote 35, at p . 215 .
43 Prosser, op . cit., footnote 1, p . 334 . This attitude is consistent witi--,
judicial reluctance to award specific enforcement, for example .
41 Ames, loc . cit ., footnote 2, at p . 16 (in Selected Essays) .
45 McNiece and Thornton, loc. cit ., footnote 35, at p. 129 ; Hale, loc . .
cit .
I
footnote 35, at p. 215 .
41 See, for example, Kiniball v. Butler Bros . (1910), 15 O.W.R . 221 :
Anderson v . Northern R~v Co . (1975), 25 U.C.C.P . 301 ; See, Fleming, op .
cit ., footnote 1, p. 164.
47 Wagner v. International Railway (1921), 232 N.Y . 176, 133 N.E . 43%
Haynes v. Harwood, [1935] 1 K.B . 146 ; Morgan v . Aylen, [19421 1 All E .
R . 489, Seymour v. Winnipeg Electric Ry . (191Q), 13 W.L.R . 566, 19 Man .
R . 412 . If conduct is rash, no recovery is possible : McDonald v. Burr,.
(191913 W.W.R . 825, 49 D.L.R . 396 (Sask . C.A .).
41 Baker v. Hopkins, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 966, Carney v . Biqea (1946), 271
App . Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S . 2d 902, appeal den . (1947), 271 App. Div. 949,
68 N.Y.S . 2d . 446 and, see, Prosser, op . cit., footnote 1, pp . 316-317 ; But
cf. Dupuis v . New Regina Trading Co., [1943) 2 W.W.R . 593, 4 D.L.R, 275 :
Wright, Note (1943), 21 Can . Bar Rev . 758 .
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third party. 49 It should be added that, to fulfill a requirement of
rendering aid to .someone who is being attacked, the rescuer need
not hurl himself upon the attacker and engage in mortal combat .
It may suffice-merely to shout, to call the police or to seek help
from others .
Some of the arguments against the creation of a positive duty
to render assistance to one in danger are administrative in nature."
First, there is the problem of selection of the individual on the
crowded beach who is to bear the responsibility for the failure to
rescue the drowning man. Admittedly, this is a difficult, if not an
insurmountable -obstacle, since
all
of the individuals who were
aware of the situation and who were capable of assisting could be
held responsible. It has been suggested that, if one is made to
assist another in danger, hordes of rescuers mayimpede one another
in the rush to comply with the law." It has been amply demonstrat-_
ed that this fear is completely unfounded and that several people
can better effectuate a rescue than one person alone." Second,
the degree of danger to which one should be required to expose
himself for the benefit of another is difficult to define . The test pro-
pounded by Prosser," however, comes as close to aworkable guide-
line as common lawyers are accustomed to : "Knowledge of serious
peril, threatening death or great bodily harm to another, which
an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience'. creates
a sufficient relation, recognized by every moralandsocial standard,
-to impose a duty of action." Third, the length of time and the
extent to which the obligation will extend poses problems. If one
binds up the wounds of a bleeding stranger, how long must he
continue to look after him and if one feeds a starving man must he
feed him forever? These imaginary problems can be easily solved
by requiring reasonable steps to be taken by all rescuers after their
initial intervention . The common law has long been accustomed
to drawing lines and making distinctions . There is no reason why
workable rules cannot be fashioned in order to make administration
feasible.
In conclusion, the common law has refused to impose a general
obligation to render aid to someone in danger for historical reasons,
in order to 'promote individualism, because it refuses to enforce
unselfishness since it is a form of slavery, because of a refusal
49 Chapman v. Hearse 1961 S.A.S.R . 51, aff'd 106 C.L.R . 112 .
10 See, McNiece and Thornton, loc. cit ., footnote 35, at p . 128 ; Hale,
loc. cit., footnote 35, p . 215 .
51 Hale, loc . 'cit., footnote 35, at p. 215. 62 Ibid.
53 Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, pp . 338-339 .
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to require an individual to expose himself to danger for the benefit
of another and because of various real or imaginary administrative
problems. Despite all of these policy reasons militating against the
enforcement of Good Samaritanism, a duty of positive action has
been developed without the intervention of legislation in several
limited situations.
[11. Developments in the Common Law.
The dictates of humanitarianism and the criticism of the authors
have had some effect in overcoming judicial dubitancy, and courts
have created a duty to come to the assistance of another in a few
instances-even in the absence of legislation . It has long been
held that where one negligentky places another in a position of
danger, he is under an obligation to render assistance." Thus,
if someone negligently injures a pedestrian with his motor vehicle,
for example, he must see that medical assistance is secured in
order to minimize the injury . Where someone who is under no
obligation to render aid does purport to assist someone in peril,
he is said to have assumed upon himself the obligation to use
reasonable care and if he is negligent during the course of rescue,
he can be held civilly responsible." The theory advanced in sup-
port ofthis view is that this is not amere failure to confer a benefit,
but it amounts to an aggravation of the plight of another." In
other words, this is misfeasance rather than nonfeasance. It is
this principle, which acts as a disincentive to potential rescuers,
that has led thirty-three legislatures in the United States to re-
lieve doctors from liability in these circumstances, 51 because it
was felt that some doctors were refusing to stop at the scene of
highway accidents because they feared that they might be sub-
jected to malpractice suits, although few cases to this effect are
discoverable .'s
Courts have indicated a willingness to categorize as misfeasance
certain conduct which superficially resembles nonfeasance in order
54 Northern Central Ry Co . v . State (1868), 29 Md . 420 ; This may also
be true where the actor is guilty of no negligence in the creation of the risk .
See, Fleming, op . cit., footnote 1, p . 146 ; Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 1, p .
338 ; See Oke v. Carra (1963), 38 D.L.R . (2d) 188, 41 D.L.R. (2d) 53 ;
Simonsen v. Thorin (1931), 120 Neb . 684, 234 N.W. 628 .
11 Braun v. Riel (1931), 40 S.W. 2d 621 (Mo .) ; Slater v . Illinois Central
R. Co. (1911), 209 F. 480.
66 Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, at p . 336 .
11 Louisell and Williams, The Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases
(1960), s . 594.2 .
1,11 Note, California Good Samaritan Legislation (1963), 51 Calif. L .
Rev . 816 ; Note, (1962), 75 Harv . L. Rev. 641 .
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to impose civil liability." Thus, the failure of a driver to apply
-the brakes of a speeding automobile, the omission of a proper
signal fora proposed left turn, and the neglect to shut offthe steam
-ofatrain in order to avoid an accident 10 will be properly hold to be
misfeasance rather - than nonfeasance. The court would ~ describe
the conduct as negligently engaging in the positive act of driving
rather than a mere failure to act.
There is an increasing group of special relations which import an
obligation to engage in positive conduct for the benefit of another.
Normally, there is some benefit enuring to the person placed under
the duty, as a result of the relation which justifies the creation of
the duty." Carriers, innkeepers, warehousemen and public utilities,
who hold themselves out to the public as being prepared to give
'service, are subjected to this responsibility.62 So too, a master
may be obliged to provide aid to one of his servants in peril, 61
a shopkeeper to his invitee,64 and a school to a pupil." Other
obligations of positive action are imposed upon occupiers of
premises to make their premises safe for the reception of certain
entrants and for passersby on the highway." The mere under-
taking or promise to render aid is seldom held to create a duty in
the absence of consideration. 1,7 But there is an inclination to hold
that the promised performance was commenced and was negli-
gently performed. This is again liability for misfeasance rather
than for nonfeasance.18
Without the assisiance of any legislation requiring positive
Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 339 .
Southern R . Co . v. Grizzle (1906), 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E . 244 ; cf. Kelly
v. Metropolitan R. Co., [1895] 1 Q.B . 944.
61 Bohlen, loc . cit., footnote 2 ; McNiece and Thornton, loc . cit., foot-
note 35 .
12 Arturburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings (1927), 75
U . Pa . L . Rev. 217 ; Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 334.
61 Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1931), 50 F. 2d 866 ; Szabo v . Pennsyl-
vania R . Co . (1945), 132 N.J.L . 331, 40 A. 2d 562 ; But cf. Vanvalkenburg
v. Northern Navigation Co . (1913), 30 OX.R. 142, 19 D.L.R . 649 which
may be limited to the situation where the employee was injured while he
was off-duty and as a result of his own fault . Fleming suggests that this
latter case "provides scant guidance for to-day", op . cit ., footnote 1,
p . 148, note 2 .
Ayres and Co. v . Hicks (1942), 220 Ind . 86, 40 N.E. 2d 334.
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School (1953), 40 -Cal . 2d 207, 253
P.2d 1 . For other relations importing liability, see Prosser, op. cit,, foot-
-note 1, pp . 337-338 ; McNiece and Thornton, loc . cit ., footnote 35 .
16 See Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 1 . chapter 19 ; Prosser, op cit ., ibid,
chapter 11 .
67 Thorne v . Deas (1809), 4 Johns, N.Y. 84 .
"I See, for example, Baxter v . Jones (1903), 6 O.L. R. -360, 20 W.R. 573 ;
'See, also, Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, p. 340 ; Fleming, op . cit., footnote I,
p . 149.
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action, therefore, the courts have moved in the direction of the
promotion of Good Samaritanism. in anumber of situations . Where
some benefit is said to enure to the defendant, where some vol-
untary relationship has been entered into, or where the conduct
can be termed misfeasance rather than nonfeasance, liability has
been imposed. It is safe to predict that these instances will expand
in the years to come in response to the changing attitudes of an
increasingly collectivist society. We shall now turn to an examin-
ation of the role of legislation in the creation of new tort duties .
IV. The Role of Legislation Generall-y.
In order to demonstrate the strength of the common law one
does not point to the way in which it has treated legislation over
the years." Judges argued until the early seventeenth century that
they could declare invalid any legislation which offended against
reason and at one time they even doubted whether the common
law was capable of amendment by statute." Blackstone lamented
that the "majestic simplicity" of the common law was being de-
stroyed by the "innovations" made by the "rash and inexperienced
workmen" of Parliament .71 The common law courts saw them-
selves as the protectors of the people against oppression by the
King or his Parliament.72 It is not surprising to learn that judicial
hostility toward legislation led to many instances of strict and
narrow construction which sometimes emasculated the policy of
the statute." The courts have done this normally by the utilization
of various canons of construction and several presumptions which
they have invented to effectuate this purpose." An array ofweapons
is available whereby a court may undermine almost any statute
which it desires to undermine. 71 The refusal of the English courts
right up to the present day to examine legislative history, debates
and the notes of draftsmen bears witness in part to this ancient
69 Pound, Common Law and Legislation (1908), 21 Harv . L. Rev . 383 ;
Landis, Statutes and The Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays (1934) .
70 Maitland, History of English Law (1902), Reprinted in Selected
Historical Essays of F . W. Maitland (1957), p . 114 .
71 See Blackstone, Commentaries on The Laws of England (1765) ; See
also, Dr. Bonham's case (1610), 8 Co. Rep. 118 .
12 Pound, op . cit ., footnote 69.
73 Ibid., For example, consider the cases interpreting the Statute of
Frauds .
7-1 See generally, Craies, Statute Law (5th ed., 1952) ; Maxwell, The
interpretation of Statutes (11th ed ., 1962) .
75 Ibid. See, for example, the way in which the courts of Ontario have
interpreted s . 105(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 15, in my
comment in (1962), 40 Can. Bar Rev . 284 .
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hostility." Heydon's case 7 l and, eventually, the Golden Rule of
statutory construction seemed to point the way to a more liberal
approach, but many courts have remained unreceptive to the
notion of promoting legislative policieS 71 even where legislation
directs them to do S0.79
Despite this general antipathy toward legislation, the courts
have promoted the policy of legislation beyond the fondest hopes of
the legislators on occasion. One major example of this is the ~ten
dency of courts to impose t6rt liability for breach of criminal
statutes, where on any fair reading of the statute one cannot avoid
the conclusion that no language to this effect was included."' In
these cases the courts insist that they are merely enforcing the
intention of the legislature," although it is now pretty well ac-
cepted, except in most judicial pronouncements, that this just is
not so." Nevertheless, the courts continue to pursue "the will
o' the wisp of a nonexistent intention" ." Even though the impo-
sition of civil liability has become rather capricious and defies
prediction on any rational basis, the courts have clung to the
received doctrine very much like the fairy tale Emperor who was
afraid to admit that his invisible new clothes did not in fact exist."
The evolution of this sorry state of affairs commenced in 1285
with the passage of the second Statute of Westminster which
provided a private remedy by action on the case to those aggrieved
by the neglect of statutory duties ." In the six hundred or so years
in which this chapter remained in force," several reported decisions
permitted civil recovery for a breach of a statute."' The early
principle was enshrined in Comyns' Digest of the Laws of England
as follows : "So in every case where a statute enacts or prohibits
a thing for the benefit of a person he shall have the remedy upon
the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage or for
76 See Kilgour, The Rule Against The Use of Legislative History (1952),
30 Can. Bar Rev . : 769 ;* Davis, Legislative History and The Wheat Board
Case (1953), 31 Can . Bar Rev . 1 .
11 (1584), 3 Co . Rep . 7a .
78 See Thorne, The Equity of A Statute and Heydon's Case (1936), 31
111 . L . Rev . 202 .
71 For example, Ontario Interpretation Act, R.S.O., 1960, c . 191, S. 10.
11 See Harper and James, op. cit ., footnote 1, p . 995 .
81 Atkinson v . Newcastle Waterworks (1877), 2 Ex. D. 441 .
82 Wright, The English Law of Torts (1955), 11 U.T.L.J . 84, at p . 94 .
11 Harper and James, op. cit., footnote 1, p . 995 ; Fleming, op . cit.,footnote 1, p . 129 .
81 1 am indebted to my colleague Professor H . W. Arthurs for this simile .See 13 Edw . 1, c. 50 ; Fricke, loc. cit ., footnote 21 .
It Was repealed in 1879 by 42-43 Vict ., c . 59.
Ashby v . White (1703), Ld . Raymond 938 ; Turner v . Sterling (1683),
2 Vent . 25 ; Couch v . Steel (1854), 3 E and Bl . 402 .
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the recompense of the wrong done to him contrary to the said
law".11 But the principle was not as clear as Comyns' articulated ;
principles never are . In two other cases" it was held that by
stipulating for a remedy, the. legislature was probably excluding
civil liability, and thus, the battle lines were drawn.
In Couch v. Steel" the defendant failed to have on board his
ship an adequate supply of medicine for the treatment of the crew,
which was a breach of a statutory requirement punishable by a
penalty which could be recovered by a common informer . Lord
Campbell distinguighed the earlier cases 9l and said that where a
private remedy was supplied in the statute, no liability would be
l'ound . Since no provision was made with regard to the right of
compensation of the person injured in the instant case, he argued
that, -unless the legislature expressly removed the common law
right of action arising out of the breach of statutory duty, this
right would continue to exiSt .92 The court, relying on Comyns'
Digest and the Statute of Westminster, seemed to have returned
to the principle which favoured claimants : unless the legislature
provided otherwise, they would be permitted to secure compensa-
tion for any damage resulting from a breach of a criminal statute
for their benefit which was punishable by fine alone .
The opposite view was taken in the case of Atkinson v. Neiv-
castle Water)vorks Co." in which a statute provided for penalties
against water companies which failed to furnish ratepayers with
an adequate supply of water. It also provided that a certain amount
was forfeited to any ratepayer who was aggrieved. Lord Cairns
held that no private remedy was available to the plaintiff whose
premises were burnt down because of insufficient water pressure .
He mis-stated the holding in Couch v. Steel and as mis-stated, he
disapproved of it . All persons aggrieved by the non-performance
of statutory duties could not automatically have a damage action
against the wrongdoer, he remonstrated . Cockburn C. J.11' and
Brett L. J." agreed that Couch v. Steel was open to "grave doubts" .
Chief Justice Campbell, however, did not say that where a private
remedy was provided in the statute, the common law right would
survive ; he held that where a public remedy alone was stipulated
for, that did not erase the private rights. Lord Cairns then laid
88 (1 SOO), Vol. I ., p. 317.
3 ~0 Steveiis v. Jeacocke (1848), 11 Q. B. 731 ; Rochester v. Bridges (1851),
1 B and Ad. 847, at p . 859.
10 Supra, footnote 87 . 93 Supra, footnote 89.
12 Supra, footnote 87, at pp . 413-414.
Supra, footnote 81 . 91AIbid., at P. 448.
lhh;~, at p . 449.
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down the principle that whether damages would :b& payable--de-
pended largely "on the purview of the legislaturd in thd particular
statute, and the language which they have there employed . . ." .11
To this statement Lord Campbell would probably have subscribed,
as he would have to the actual decisision in the Atkinson case .
This is evidenced by the fact that in Groves v. Wimborne," the
court relied on both -the Couch v. Steel case and the Atkinson v.
Newcastle Waterworks Co . case in reaching its decision. In the
Groves v. Wimborne ease, a failure to fence machinery as was
required by statute led to the infliction of an injury on a workman.,
In holding the defendant liable, the court uttered the words of
Lord Cairns in the Atkinson case 17 but adopted the, approach of
the Couch v. Steel case . The
i
court said that "unless it appears
from the whole purview of the act, to use the language of Lord
Cairns in the case of Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co.,
that it was the intention of the Legislature that the only remedy
for the breach of the statutory duty should be by proceeding for
the fine,. it follows that upon proof of a breach .,of that duty
by the employer and injury thereby occasioned to -the workman,
a cause of action is established . . ." . 911 The court took no cogni-
zance of the intervening repeal of the section in the second Statute
of Westminster with which the tortuous trail began."
These cases are not as violently in conffict as some believe.""
All insist upon the search for the legislative intention ; all agree
that if private rights are inserted into the act, common law rights
are eclipsed ; and all agree that where a penalty alone is provided
for, the private rights are not necessarily obliterated. The cases
differ primarily in the approach taken, which is, however', signif-
icant. In Couch v. Steel and Groves v. Wimb.orn.e, the private
rights were to survive unless they were removed by a contrary
legislative intention; in the Atkinson case, private rights were to
expire unless the opposite was demonstrated by a visible legislative
intention. The position has not been clarified to the present day"'
permitting courts to select the approach which will enable them
to reach the result they desire.102 This may be most convenient
for those who wish to disguise the true reasons for judicial de-
16 Ibid., at p . 449 . 96 [1898] 2 Q .
97 Ibid., at p . 407 . 18 Ibid.
19 Supra, footnote 86.
110 Fricke, op . cit ., footnote 21, at p . 260.
101 Street Torts (2nd ed., 1959), p. 273 .
102 Cf Approach taken in Cutler v . Wandsworth Stadium, [1949] A.C .
398 and that taken in Monk v . Warbey, [193511 K.B . 75 . .
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cisions, but it is totally unsatisfactory to explain, to rationalize or
to predict the outcome of these cases.
V. Legislative Intention: Myth or Reality.
There are a few rate instances where civil liability is expressly
created by legislation . Here, of course, the pursuit of the legislative
intention is the proper method of attack . The Railway Act of
CanadaM expressly confers a cause of action on anyone injured
by a breach of certain of its provisions . Similarly, a breach of the
Safety Appliance Act of the United States creates civil liability
expressly."' There are other examples including the responsibility
ofthe owner of amotor vehicle for damage resulting from its use,""
the liability for breach of the Taft-Hartley Act by engaging in
secondary picketing and jurisdictional and recognitional strikes, 116
the civil responsibility of individuals who run afoul of anti-trust
legislation,107 abutters who fail to clear the public sidewalks in
front of their property"Is and others . 109 In still fewer situations
liability for breach of a criminal statute is expressly excluded.110
But the express provision dealing with civil liability is the exception
rather than the rule and judges and authors have complained of
this,"'
In the majority of cases, the legislation gives no explicit guid-
ance with regard to civil liability . Rather than holding that the
legislature had no intention qua civil liability since it expressed
none,112 the courts have continued to seek this non-existent legis-
lative intention. They have concentrated on the penalty that is
provided in the statute or the lack of it . If no criminal sanction
is included in the legislation, the courts have concluded that the
legislature must have intended that civil liability be imposed
101 R.S.C., 1952, c . 234, s . 4130) .
101 See (1946), 45 U.S.C., s. 13 ; Chicago R.R . V . Schendel (1924), 267
U.S. 287 ; Daggett v . Keshner (1954), 284 App . Div. 733, 134 N.Y.S . 2d
524 .
105 See Ontario Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 15, s . 105(l) ;
California Vehicle Code (1959), §17150.
106 See (1947), 29 U.S.C ., s . 187, s. 303(b) and Arthurs, Tort Liability
for Strikes in Canada (1960), 38 Can. Dar Rev . 346, at p . 361 .
107 For example, Sherman Act suits for treble damages . See 15 U.S.C.A.
§1-7 (1890) .
113 See ordinances in Willis v . Parker (1919), 225 N.Y . 159, 121 N.E.
810 ; Texas Co . v. Grant (1944), 143 Tex. 145, 182 S.W . 2d 996 .
See Mines Act of Victoria 0958), s . 411(1) .
For example, see Ontario Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 15,
s . 105(2) .
M Lord Du Pareq in Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium, supra, footnote
102
1
at p. 410 ; Fricke, loc . cit ., footnote 21 .
112 As suggesLed by Lowndes, loc. cit ., ibid.
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because otherwise the statute would be only a "pious aspir-
ation"J" Some earlier cases had indicated thaVwhere a penalty
was provided, it was the only remedy available,"' but these cases
have not been uniformly followed ."' If the .injured party is able
to recover the penalty himself rather .than the state alone, the courts
lean to the view that no additional recovery'at common law should
be allowed."' This is probably the explanation for the Atkinson
decision I" although Brett L. J. insisted that , it made no differ-
ence.118 This conclusion was disagreed with,.. however, in at least
one decision where the: court felt that merely because an informer
could collect the penalty, the legislature had not necessarily in-
tended to remove other potential civil remedies .q 19
Some courts have engaged in a futile assessment of the adequacy
of the penalties provided in order to discover the true intention
of the le islature. Where the penalty is a severe one, - they nor-91
mally hold that the legislatureintended that as the sole remedy,121)
and where the penalty is small, courts have tended to decide that
the legislature must have intended civil liability to be imposed as
an additional sanction."' This latter statement has not gone un-
challenged, and in one case the court indicated that where only a
small penalty was imposed, it might indicate a benevolent . legis-
.1ative attitude toward the defendant rather than the intention
that additional civil liability be imposed.122
The courts have utilized other legislative interpretation devices
in their quest for the intention of the legislature, but these have
yielded equally unsatisfactory results. For example, the court
may rely on the title or the preamble of the statute to give it a clue
as to the legislative intention. The Factories and Shops Act"' is one
113 See Lord Simonds in Cutler v; Wandsworth Stadium, supra, footnote
102, at p. 407 ; Attorney-General v. St. Ives R.D,C., (19591 3 All E.R . 371
(Q.B.D .),
1-14 For example, see Stevens v . Jeacocke, and Rochester v . Bridges,
supra, footnote 89 ; Brain v. Thomas (1881), 50 L.J . Q-B. 662.
"I See for example, Couch v . Steel, supra, footnote 87 ; Groves v .
W(mborne, supra, footnote 96 .
"I Simmonds v . Newport & Co., [19211 1 K.B. 616 ; Fahey v. Jephcott
(1901), 2 O.L.R. 449, at p . 453 ; Mack v . Wright (1897), 180 Pa . 472, 36
Ad . 913 ; Town of Battleboro v . Wait (1872), 44 Vt . 459 ; Irvine v. Metro-
politan Transport, [1933] O.R . 823, 4 D.L.R . 682.
Supra, footnote 81 . I'll Ibid., at p. 441 .
See Lord Chelmsford in Wilson v . Merry (1868), L.R . I H.L. (S.C.1
326, at p . 341 .
121 Cutler v . Wandsworth Stadium, supra, footnote 102 at p. 414.,
121 Irvine v . Metropolitan Transport, supra, footnote 116,~ O'Connor v .
Bray (1937), 56 C.L.R . 464, at p . 486 .
122 Commerford v . Board of School Commissioners, supra, footnote 17,
at p . 218 .
'121 Factories and Shops Act, 1912 (N.S.W.), No . 39.
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example where the purpose of the statute according to its preamble
is the "extension of the liability of employers for injuries suf-
fered by employees in certain cases",121 and where the court might
ivell find an intention to confer a civil cause of action. When
some breaches of legislative provisions in a statute are expressly
made to create civil liability, the court will probably refuse to
impose civil liability for breaches of any other provisions in the
absence of clear words to that effect '125 relying on the canon of
construction expressio unitts est exclusio allerizis . 126 On occasion
the court has fastened onto imperative words such as "shall pro-
vide" and imposed liability for any failure so to provide."21 Other
such devices have been invoked .
It should be apparent by now that it is futile to rely on the
so-called legislative intention with regard to civil liability in all
but a very few cases. Most of the authors 128 have seen that this
was a meaningless hunt and even a few judges 121 have expressed
this view . Chief Justice Owen Dixon was probably the most in-
geDuous wben he pointed out in O'Connor v. Bray"I that this ex-
ercise was probably more a matter "governing the policy of the
provision rather than the meaning of the instrument" . Justice
Trueman, in a dissenting judgment in Wasney v. Jurazsky,1 11
remarked that it was not the Criminal Code which created the
civil liability for its breach but the common law rules. In Placatka
v. Thompson, 132 the court confided that the civil right arises un-
der provincial law and not out of the breach of the regulations
under the federal Explosives Act, and in Lochgelly Iron & Coal
v. McMullan,'" Lord Wright recognized as well, that it was the
common law which gave the right of action for a private injury
flowing from a breach of a criminal statute. But these few instances
stand almost alone in the midst of scores of cases on this topic
which blindly proclaim that they are seeking the legislativeintention.
Until this psychotic quest for the non-existent intention is ab-
124 See Fricke, loc. cit ., footnote 21, at 257 .
125 Commeiford v . Board of School Commissioners, supra, footnote 17 .
126 See Toronto-St. Catherine's Transport v. Toronto, [19541 1 D . L .R.
721 (S.C.C .), Mr. Justice Rand, at p . 731, Mr. Justice Kellock, at p . 732,
and Mr. Justice Estey, at p . 737 .
127 Read v . Croydon Corp., [193814 All E.R . 63 1 .
12 Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 128 ; Prosser, op. cit., footnote 1,
p. 192 ; Harper and James, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 995 ; Wright, loc. cit.,
footnote 82 ; Lowndes, loc. cit ., footnote 21, Alexander, loc. cit., footnote
21 ; Thayer, loc4 cit ., footnote 21 ; Morris, loc . cit., footnote 21 .
129 Justice Dixon, for example, in O'Connor v . Bray supra, footnote 121 .
130 Ibid., at p . 478 . 231 Supra, fooinote 30,
M f 194112 D.L.R . 320, at p . 324 (Alta . C.A .) .
113 [1934) A .C . 1, 22 .
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andoned by courts,"' these cases will remain a mystery. Reliance
on alternative presumptions and examination of the severity of
the penalty provisions yield only unsatisfactory results ; other
interpretation devices lend assistance only in relatively few in-
stances. There must exist some other unexpressed reasons to
explain the courts' persistence in the application of criminal statutes
in civil cases. An examination of the cases will now be under-
taken in order to discover what these underlying reasons are.-
VI. Breach of Legislation which Creates New Duties Where None
Existed at Common Law.
The courts and some of the authors have generaRy not distin-
guished between statutes which are used to create new duties
.where none existed at common law and statutes setting, specific
standards of care where duties were already recognized ."' The
courts have invoked the legislative intention doctrine as the tech-
nique utilized to resolve both problems alike.
The courts' failure to differentiate between these divergent
uses of criminal legislation has resulted in the recognition of
new tort duties, where a complete understanding of the issue and
a candid appraisal of the conflicting policies may have led to
another conclusion. Since to create a new tort duty is a more
serious step than merely to crystallize the standard of care to
be used where a duty already exists, courts might be expected
to be more reluctant to engage in the former operation through .
the use of criminal statutes."' In minimizing the importance of
judicial use of legislation to, concretise the standard of care by
explaining it as a mere procedural change,, and in opposing its
use, to create new duties, Thayer may have been motivated by a
fear of judicial opposition to any use of statutes whatsoever . He
may.have been attempting to win at least some recognition for
criminal legislation in tort cases in an atmosphere of pervading
judicial hostility. By limiting his objectives, some progress might
be made, whereas, if he advocated reliance on legislation to create
new duties, as well as to set standards, all might be lost. Better
to ,take half a step than not to take any step at all .
134 Alexander, loc. cit ., footnote 21, at p . 276, is not very optimistic
about this eventuality coming to pass.
1~ 5 Salmond, op . cit ., footnote 26, p . 467 ; Charlesworth, op . cit., foot~
note 26, p . 951 ; Fricke, loc. cit., footnote 21 . Cf. Morris, loc . cit., footnote
21 ; Gregory, loc. cit ., footnote 21 ; Thayer, loc . cit ., footnote ,21 ; Alexander,
loc. cit., footnote 21 ; Williams, loc. cit., footnote 21 .
116 See Alexander, loc . cit ., ibid., at pp. 255-256.
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There are several policy reasons which favour the use of
criminal statutes to create new tort duties . Most important of
these is the argument for comity which holds that in a democratic
society the policies enunciated in legislation should be given proper
respect by the judiciary. 1 -37 Legislation is the product of the elected
representatives of the people whereas judges are appointed and
are not as responsive to the popular will . Somewhat related to
this line of reasoning is the contention that legislatures, with their
large facilities for research and investigation, may be better qualified
than courts to make informed value judgments. Courts should
give considerable weight to legislative enactments which reflect
this superior expertise."' Some people suggest that a civil sanction
should be added to the penalty provided by the legislature as an
additional deterrent which will motivate the observance of the
legislation, thus affording better protection to that segment of
society which the legislature wished to protect."' This supple-
mentary sanction may also assist in Rushing out more of those
who violate the legislation since the profit motive of a tort judgment
may encourage would-be informers, and people are more likely
to report wrongdoing if they have some financial stake in so
doing."' By refusing to punish wrongdoing by means of a tort
judgment as well as a criminal penalty, it may appear that the
court is sanctioning criminal conduct. To avoid being placed in
this position, courts may be tempted to impose civil liability as
an additional punishment to those who breach the criminal law.141
Lastly, if courts are so inclined, they may expand the frontiers
of the law into new areas heretofore untouched by civil liability
by analogy to these criminal statutes . 142
Countervailing policy arguments are available against the im-
position of tort liability in addition to criminal liability. Although
courts should give full effect to the commandments of the legis
lature, they should proceed no further than the legislature com-
manded, since it chose not to impose civil liability for breach of
the legislation which it might easily have done . 14,1 The democracy
137 See Thayer, loc. cit., footnote 21 .
11~ Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 1, p. 135 ; Morris, loc. cit ., footnote 21,
at p . 48 .
139 Pollock, Law of Torts (14th ed ., 1939), p. 20 .
X40 Fricke, loc. cit ., footnote 21 .
W Since after all "the law is disobeyed", see Pollock, op . cit ., footnote
139, p . 20 ; See also Thayer, loc . cit., footnote 21, p . 283 in Selected Essays,
op . cit ., footnote 2 .
142 Morris, loc . cit., footnote 21 .
143 Thayer, loc. cit ., footnote 21
,
p . 290 in Selected Essays, op. cit,,
footnote 2 .
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argument cuts the other way here, and precludes the court from
superimposing its wishes over those expressed by the elected legis-
latuie .144 It might be contended that it is unfair to hold someone
civilly~-
.
liable for his conduct without some prior warning being
issued-.' Morris - has indicated that this complaint is invalid since
the criminal law has declared in advance that certain conduct
would subject the violator to some criminal sanction, so that he
is not caught completely off-guard. 141 It is also suggested that the
conduct required or prohibited may be difficult to enforce, but
Morris has shown that this is unlikely, since the legislature, which
must have studied this aspect of the matter, has decided that it
was capable of enforcement. Because many of these new crimes
have been enacted by inferior bodies, such as municipalities and
administrative agencies, and because of the judicial distrust of
these bodies, the courts have resisted the addition of civil liability
to the criminal penalties laid down.146 Criminal statutes may be
unwisely severe, and to impose potentially ruinous civil hablity
for their breach is unfair141 and smacks of double jeopardy. Final-
ly, and probably most importantly, is the age-old argument about
the danger of expanding liability and of providing new remedies .
Thayer has said that "it is a dubious and a dangerous thing for
the courts to speculate as to unexpressed legislative intent and
create private remedies by implication" .141 This is, of course, the
floodgates argument that is dredged up whenever the "timorous
souls" attempt to block the "bold spirits" from developing the
common law. 141 Tangentially, the phobia about strict liability and
the judicial struggle to confine its operation lurks in the back-
groundi"O By the adoption of a legislative standard, fault liability
is thought to be abandoned and replaced by strict liability.151
But this does not necessarily follow. The court has on at least one
occasion created a -new duty based,on a breach of statute which
144 Ibid.
141 Morris, loc. cit., footnote 21, p. 1441n Studies.
146 See, for example, the attitude of Lord Atkin in Phillips v. Brittania
Hygienic Laundry Co., [1923) 2 K.B . 832 .
147 Morris, loc . cit ., footnote 21, p . 144, in Studies, op . cit., footnote 25 .
148 Thayer, op. cit., footnote 21, p . 290 in Selected Essays, op . cit.,
footnote 2. "
149 See Lord Justice Denning in Candler v . Crane, Christmas, & Co.,
[195112 K.B . 164, 1 All E.R . 426 .
110 See Read v. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156, 2
All
E.R. 471, and see
Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 1, p . 308 .
151 Fleming, op . cit ., ibid., p . 135 ; Maharsky v . C.P.R . (1904), 15 Man.
R. 53, at p . 80 (C.A.) ; Phillips v . Brittania Hygienic Laundry Co., supra,
footnote 146 .
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required only reasonable care of those who were held subject
to that duty . 112
These are the conflicting policies that the court must balance
prior to reaching a decision as to whether it should create a new
tort duty based on a criminal statute or whether it should refuse
to do so . All the talk about legislative intention only screens the
real bases of decision . The existence of a criminal statute is one of
the factors that courts will assess along with the other conflicting
policies whether this is admitted openly or not. An analysis of
several groups of cases where the courts have created new tort
duties based on criminal statutes will now be made. The attempt
will be made to discover which of these policy reasons motivated
the courts in their resolution of the cases . First, the compulsory
insurance legislation cases will be discussed, then the "hit and run"
cases, followed by the family support decisions. the abutter cases.
and finally other assorted situations will be examined .
1 . Compulsory insurance legislation.
The Columbia Report in 1932 estimated that an injured plain-
tiff had only about a twenty-five per cent chance of recovering
anything from an uninsured motorist, whereas, if the motorist
defendant was insured, he had about an eighty-five per cent
chance of securing some compensation ."' There are still over
10,000,000 uninsured vehicles in the United States, which if in-
volved in accidents may lead to tort judgments amounting to
empty shells. 164 Since a similar situation existed in the British
Commonwealth, there was a need for legislative action to improve
the plight of those injured by uninsured drivers. Amongthe devices
used were the imposition of civil liability on the owner of a vehicle
involved in an accident,"' financial responsibility laws"' and un-
satisfied judgment funds. 167 A few jurisdictions resorted to the more
drastic compulsory liability insurance legislation which made it a
crime to drive an automobile that was uninsured. 151 The primary
162 Read v. Croydon, supra, footnote 127, at p . 65 1 .
153 Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents
Report to the Columbia University Council for Research in Social Scien-
ces (1932) .
~51 Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 578 .
Ontario Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote 15, s . 105(l) .
N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, Art . 6, §310-321 .
167 See Ontario Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, 1961-62, S.O .,
1961-62, c. 84 ; N.J. Laws, 1952, c. 174, Similar legislation has been
adopted in other American states as well .
151 E.g., Mass . Ann . Laws, c . 90, N.Y . Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 310 ;
N.C. Sess . Laws of 1957, c . 1393, United Kingdom . see infra, Australia .
see Fleming, op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 356 .
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object of these laws was to ensure the existence of a fund out of
which a plaintiff could satisfy any potential judgment, at least
to the dollar limits required. Only incidentally were they to benefit
a solvent defendant who might be muleted in damages, although
this was an inevitable by-product.
Prior to the passage of these statutes, there was - no civil duty
to insure oneself against public liability in order to provide a
potential claimant with a financially solvent defendant. As a result
of the enactment of this criminal legislation, the English courts
created a new civil obligation toward a third person who was
injured by an uninsured vehicle. Section 35(l) of the Road Traffic
Act of 1930"1 provided that "- . . it shall not be lawful for any
person to use or to cause or permit any other person to use, a
motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the
user of the vehicle . . . such a policy of insurance. . . as complies
with the requirements of this part of the Act." Subsection 2 pro-
vided for the penalty of a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, a prison
term not exceeding ihree months, or a license disqualification for
a period of twelve months unless otherwise ordered . Subsection 4
allowed the owner to deposit 15,000 pounds with the court ac-
countant in lieu of securing insurance. Another statute created a
right in the third party to sue the defendant's insurance company
after judgment was secured in the event oftheir default ofpayment,
thus, overcoming the third party beneficiary problem."'
The celebrated and much impugned case of Monk v. Warbey "I
was the decision which created the new civil duty to insure by
analogy to the criminal statute. The defendant Warbey permitted
his Motor vehicle to be used by Knowles who allowed a third per-
son, May, to use it. Although the ownerhimself was insured against
third party risks neither Knowles nor May were . May negligently
caused injury to the plaintiff Monk who sued Knowles, May and
Warbey. When interlocutory judgments were secured against
Knowles and May, they were unable to satisfy them, andthe matter
proceeded against Warbey on the theory that his breach of the
statute gave rise to civil liability on his part. The trial judge ac-
cepted this view and he was affirmed by the Court of Appeal .. Lord Justice Greer selected the approach of Groves v. Wim-
borne 161 and said that unless a contrary view was expressed in the
statute, a civil obligation was conferred by the breach of a criminal
159 20 & 21 Geo . 5, c . 43,
110 Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo . 5,c. 25 .
M Supra, footnote 102 . 162 Supra, footnote 96 .
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statute . He formulated the principle as follows : "Prima facie a
person who has been injured by a breach of a statute has a right
to recover damages from the person committing it unless, it can
be established by considering the whole of the Act that no such
right was intended to be given. So far as that being shown in this
case, the contrary is established." "I Two of the judges purported
to rely on subsection 4 as evidence of a legislative intention to
confer civil rights.1 64
But the real reason for the decision was not the interpretation
exercise engaged in by the court. It was the desire to advance the
legislative policy of protecting the people injured in automobile
accidents by supplying them with an insurance fund out of which
to recover anyjudgment which they might secure . Supplementary
to this, was the feeling that the criminal sanction was inadequate
to effectuate this purpose. Lord Justice Greer said :"' "[S.] 35 . . .
would indeed be no protection to a person injured bythe negligence
of an uninsured person to whom a car had been lent by the insured
owner, if no civil remedy were available for a breach of the sec-
tion." His Lordship further stated that : "To prosecute for a penalty
is no sufficient protection and is poor consolation to the injured
person though it affords a reason why persons should not commit
a breach of the statute." "I This reasoning was echoed by Lord
Justice Maugham when he said : "I " . . . s. 35 was passed for the
purpose of giving a remedy to third persons who might suffer
injury by the negligence of an impecunious driver of a car . . ." and
further"' ". . . when the Act was passed it was within the know-
ledge of the Legislature that negligence in the driving of cars was
so common an occurrence that the likelihood of injury to third
persons that it was necessary in the public interest to provide
machinery whereby those third persons might recover damages".
Because the court was sympathetic to the legislative policy of pro-
tecting persons injured by uninsured drivers, it added a new civil
duty to provide insurance coverage to the regular criminal sanction .
The language of legislative interpretation was only a cloak that
shielded only imperfectly the judicial desire to buttress the policy
of the statute .
This decision has been attacked by Glanville Williams as "an
improper type of judicial invention" . 169 Fleming has described it
163 Ibid., at p . 9 1 .
161 Ibid., Roche L. J ., at p . 86, Maugharn L.J., at p . 86 .
11-1 Ibid., at p . 80. "'Ibid., at p. 8 1 .
117 Ibid., at p . 85 . "1 Ibid., at p. 865 .
"I Loc . cit. . footnote 21, at p . 259 .
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as "a most blatant arrogation of legislative authority", as being
"difficult to justify on any account","' and as an example of
judicial discretion being stretched "beyond . . . legitimate
bounds"."' At the same -time, without seeing the inconsistency in
his position, he argues that it is easy and proper to infer, a legis-
lative intention to create private rights from statutes which set
specific safety standards.172 If it is proper to conjure up a fictional
legislative intention to fix the standard of care, it is no less proper
to do likewise to create a new duty of care. Both are disingenuous
tactics invoked by courts to reach certain desired conclusions.
Probably, the true reason for Fleming drawing his distinction
is that he, like Thayer, does not want'to risk encountering more
solid judicial reaction to the use of all criminal statutes in tort
cases. Fleming also expresses the view that legislation should not
be used to create new duties of care because "the jump from or-
dinary negligence to strict liability is one thing, that from no duty
to strict liability is quite another", 171 again evincing his fear of a
total judicial rejection of legislation if too much is sought to be
done thereby. It is not necessary, however, to go from no duty to
strict liability; the court may create a duty to use only reasonable
care on the basis of a statute. 114 While both of these reasons may
have been grounds for advising caution in the early part of this
century, criminal legislation is relied upon nowin tort cases and the
courts -should . no longer be prevented from creating new civil
duties by analogy to criminal statutes in proper cases .
Despite these criticisms, Monk v. Warbey appears to be well
entrenched in English law, having received the imprimatur of the
House of Lords in McLeod (or Houston) v . Buchanan,175 and is no
longer . even questioned by counsel."' Lord Wright stated that
"the provision is an important element in the policy of the legis-
lature to secure the benefit of insurance for sufferers of road ac-
cidents" . 177 He spoke of the provision being "imperative" and
"precise" and of the "wrongdoing motor vehicle""' indicating
that he was relying on the so-called intention of the legislation
and, perhaps, on the need for an additional penalty to punish the
defendant .
170 Op . cit., footnote I (2nd ed ., 1961), p . 134, footnote 11 .
VI Op. cit ., ibid., (3rd ed., 1964), p . 130 .
172 Ibid.
1-73 Op. cit ., footnote 170, p . 133 . This sentence does not appear
third edition .
174 Read v. Croydon, supra, footnote 152.
176 [1940] 2 All E.R . 179 . 176 Ibid., at p . 186 .
177 Ibid . 178 Ibid.
in the
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There are some limits on the scope of operation of Monk v .
Warbey in that only an owner can be held civilly liable and not
an auctioneer,"' nor anyone who merely assisted another to breach
the section, 110 since the owner alone has enough control over the
motor vehicle to forbid its unlawful use."' It has been held that
this provision has not been passed for the benefit of a servant of
the uninsured owner, but for the benefit of third parties."' In one
case. the plaintiff failed to recover against an owner who was in
breach of the statute since the cause of his loss was not the lack
of insurance but the delay of the plaintiff in the prosecution of
his claim."'
The decision of Monk v. Warbey stands as one well.-settled ex-
ample of a case in which a new tort duty was established on the
basis of a breach of criminal legislation, because the court wished
to promote the policy enshrined in the statute.
2. Hit and run statutes .
In recent years many jurisdictions have enacted criminal legis-
lation requiring motorists who have been involved in accidents
to stop, give their name and address and to render assistance ."'
The multiple purposes of this legislation is to enforce Good Sa-
maritanism and to prevent the evasion of criminal and civil re-
sponsibility. In the United States, this legislation has led to the
creation of a new tort duty to render aid in addition to any crim-
inal duty which may exist.
one must distinguish between the situation where the driver
of the vehicle was at fault and where he was not at fault for the
original accident . The driver was under a duty at common law to
render assistance in order to minimize any injury tortiously in-
flicted,"' but prior to the passage of this legislation, no duty to
render aid was recognized where the driver innocently created the
179 Watkins v. O'Shaughnessy, [1939] 1 All E.R . 385 (C.A.) .
181) Goodbarne v. Buck, [1940] 1 K.B. 771, 1 All E.R . 615 (C.A .) .
is, ibid.
18"Semsex Ltd. v. Gladstone, (1954] 1 W.L.R . 945; Gregory v. Ford,
[1951] 1 All E.R . 121 .
19*3 Daniels v. Faux, [193812 K.B . 203, 2 All E.R . 271 .
184 See, for example, Canadian Criminal Code, supra, footnote 18,
S*
110 "offer assistance" ; Ontario Highway Traffic Act, supra, footnote
15, s. 143(a), "render all possible assistance" ; Calif. Vehicle Code, §20003,
"render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance" ; Ind .
Rev. Statutes 1934, §11171, "render or offer to render assistance".
285 Prosser, op . cit., footnote 1, %,338, Restatement ofthe Law of Torts,
§322 ; Racine v. C.N.R ., [1923) 1
W .
R . 1439, 2 D.L.R . 572, 19 Alta .
529 (C.A .) ; Tronibley v. Kolts (1938), 29 Cal . App . 2d 699, JV. Central R.R.
Co . v. Pric e (1868), 29 Md . 420, 96 Am. Dec. 545 .
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initial peril."' The enactment of this hit and run legislation has
altered all that by spurring the creation of a civil duty to render
-assistance even where the initial injury is innocently caused by
the driver .
The distinction of being the first state to recognize this new
civil duty goes to Louisiana. In Langenstein v. Reynaud, 1117judgment
went against a defendant who failed to stop after colliding with a
pedestrian in violation of a hit and run statute. The death of his
victim was either caused or hastened when a second automobile
collided with him while he lay helpless on the road. The court
stated that if the defendant had stopped and removed the victim
to a place of safety, as the law directed, the second accident would
not have occurred."' The only reason given for the decision was
that : "He certainly knew in his conscience that he was doing wrong
in fleeing from the scene of the accident, leaving his victim pros-
trate in the street . . . ." 191 Liability in tort was just assumed, al-
though a possible rationale for the case may have been the desire
to inflict additional punishment on any evil person who flees from
- the scene of an accident . Unfortunately, the facts of the case would
--indicate that the defendant was at fault for the accident initially,
which may explain the failure of the court to deal at length with
the legislation issue.
Shortly thereafter, in Battle v. Kilcrease, 110 the Georgia Court
of Appeals expressed the view that no error was committed when
the jury was charged to the effect that they could find negligence
as a matter of law where someone failed to stop contrary to a
statutory provision. A verdict for the plaintiff was upheld, but the
court failed to cite one case or give any reason for their decision .
Again, the facts appear to manifest some initial negligence by
- the defendant.""
California joined the parade soon after, and in Summers v.
1~111 Prosser, op . cit., !bid., p. 338 ; Restatement of the Law of Torts,
§322, Caveat ; Union Pacific v . Cappier (1903), 66 Kan . 649, 72 P . 281 ;
Turbeville v . Mobile Light & R. Co . (1930), 121 Ala. 91, 127 So . 519 . There
is some slim authority to indicate that if peril is innocently created, there
may be a duty to minimize ensuing damage, Prosser, ibid., p. 338 and Ayres
& Co . v. Hicks (1942), 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E . 2d 334.
187(1930), 13 La . App . 272,127 So . 764 (C.A .) .
188 Ibid., at p . 766 (So .) . 181 Ibid.
190 (1936), 54 Ga. App . 808, 189 S.E . 573 .
1911 The case seems to declare that there is no necessity for proof of
additional harm resulting from the failure to render aid, but the case
really turned on the punitive damages point and the issue of whether
breach of this statute could be evidence of original negligence . See infra.
Cf. Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. .Snyder (1947), 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir .),
where no liability, because no evidence of additional damage.
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Domingttez, 19 L' declared in a dictum that a separate civil action could
be maintained for the wilful breach of a statutory duty to render
aid regardless of any negligence of the plaintiff which may have
contributed to the initial injury .193 The court again did not ar-
ticulate any reasons for the decision.
In Hallman v. Cushman,"' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
indicated that it would allow a jury to consider evidence of the
failure to stop contrary to a statute which increased the pain suf
Bered by an injured person with a view to the assessment of ad-
ditional damages. The case turned largely on other matters, how-
ever .
Probably the leading case is Brooks v. E. J. Willig Transport
Co.,'" in which the court upheld a jury instruction to the effect
that knowingly to refuse to stop after an accident, which proxi-
mately caused the death of the plaintiff, was a breach of a civil
duty which did not depend on the negligence of the driver, nor on
the freedom from contributory negligence by the victim . Chief
Justice Gibson stated the principle as follows: "One who negli-
gently injures another and renders him helpless is bound to use
reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the actor
realizes or should realize threatens the injured person . This duty
existed at common law although the accident was caused in part
by the negligence of the person who was injured . . . . Sections 480
and 482 of the Vehicle Code (now 20001 and 20003) require an
automobile driver who injures another to stop and render aid.
This duty is imposed upon the driver whether or not he is responsible
for the accident, and a violation gives rise to civil liability if it is a
proximate cause offitrther injury or death." "I The court did not
favour posterity with any reasons for its decision, nor did it even
cite the earlier case of Summers v. Doininguez,117 decided in the
same state .
Prosser claims that this case suggests that the duty to render
assistance may exist at common law even in the absence of the
fault of the driver ."' It is submitted that he is in error. A careful
reading of the case will demonstrate that the court recognized
the duty to render aid at common law only where one negligently
1 9 2 (1938), 29 Cal. App . 2d 308, 84 P.2d 237 (D.C.A .).
"I The plaintiff ultimately did not have to rely on this proposition and
removed it from his pleading, allowing his case to rest solely on the negli-
gence which caused the original accident .
194 (1941), 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E. 2d 498 .
195 (1953), 40 Cal . 2d 669, 255 P.2d 802.
"I Ibid., at pp . 808-809 . Italics mine .
197 Supra, footnote 192. 198 Op . cit ., footnote 1, p . 338 .
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injured another. However, since the criminal statute. did not dif-
ferentiate between the case where there was negligence in bring-
ing about the original injury and where there was not, the court
followed the criminal law and imposed civil liability on the driver
for failure to render aid "whether or not he is responsible for the
accident". 119, It is suggested that the word "responsible" here
means "legally responsible," which the defendant would not be,
unless he was at fault. Thus, the Supreme Court of California was
prepared to utilize the hit and run statute to create a new duty
to render aid even in the absence of any initial negligence causing
the injury, although on the evidence, there was a strong likelihood
that the driver had been negligent originally.
West Virginia and Texas have also recognized this new duty .-
In Brumfield v. Wofford,200 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals refused to strike out an allegation of failure to stop and
render assistance in violation of a statute without giving reasons
and without citing any authorities for this view. The Texas court
followed suit in Boyer v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co.,"' even though it
had to dismiss the action for lack of evidence which would show
that the failure to stop proximately caused the deathof the plaintiff.
In the case, a train had killed the plaintiff's wife at a crossing,
but the employees of the railway were guilty of no negligence with
regard to the accident. Texas did not adhere to the rule which
requires one to render aid if he brings about an injury, even in
the absence of fault.202 Despite this, the Texas court relied on the
dicta in the Brooks and Summers cases, and ruled that breach
of the hit and run statute imposed a civil duty to render assistance .
Again, no policy reasons were offered by the court.
The policy reasons which generated the creation of the new
duty to aid in hit and run cases, although unarticulated by the
courts, are fairly obvious, The civil courts are assisting the legis
lative policy of promoting Good Samaritanism on the highways
where many thousands are killed and injured each year."' By im-
posing the further sanction of civil liability, the courts may hope to
reduce the incidence ofhit andrun violations, saving afewlives and
diminishing some suffering. It may be that the courts wish to wreak
vengeance on the evil men who disobey the statute with an ad-
MBrooks v . E; J. Willig Transport Co., supra, footnote 195, at P . 808 .
210 (1958), 143 W. Va . 332, 102 S.E. 2d 103 .201 0957), 306 S.W . 2d 215 (Tex. Civ . App.) .
202 Ibid., at p . 295 .
213 In Canada over 4,000 people are killed and over 100,000 are injured
annually. In the United States of America over 40,000 are killed each year .
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ditional sanction . The moral repugnance felt toward these people
is not disguised.114 The fact that courts rely upon proof of a breach
of hit and run statute as evidence that the original accident was
negligently caused,'201 and the fact that they permit punitive damages
to be awarded in these circumstances, lend some credence to this
VieW .211 The statute provides the courts with a convenient me-
chanism through which to expand liability for nonfeasance . This
development has been made easier by the widespread insurance
coverage for automobile liability which ensures that potential
victims will in all likelihood be compensated by the insurance
fund . The close resemblance of these facts to the cases where the
defendant negligently caused injury and to the cases where the
defendant controlled an instrumentality which caused it, may
have facilitated a smooth transition to the creation of liability.
So too,, the absence of any administrative problems, such as the
selection of the individual who is to be responsible, may have
helped the courts to overcome any latent misgivings . In any event,
a new civil duty has been created in the hit and run cases, to render
aid even where there is no initial fault on the part of the driver,
ostensibly by analogy to the criminal statute . It is true that in all
the cases, the statements of the judges were probably only dicta,
but these pronouncements have been strong and clear and have
remained unchallenged by either authors or judges . It appears
that this new duty will survive and prosper in the years ahead.
3. Fandly support legislation.
We have already seen that there is no duty to feed a starving
man, to give water to one dying of thirst on the desert, to clothe
one who is freezing or to secure medical attention to one who is
bleeding to death. He who fails to supply any of these things
may have to answer to his maker but need not answer to the law. 107
This was so even in the case of parent and child.',',' In recent years,
however, there has been a change of attitude where there is a
family relation involved . Criminal legislation has been enacted
requiring fathers to look after their children, husbands to look after
their wives, and cbildren to look after their parents. Part of the
201 The statute carries with it a "moral odium", see Greyhound Co . v .
Atilt (1956), 238 F.2d 198, 202 (5th Cir.) .
201 Battle v. Kilcrease, supra, footnote 190 ; Haffinan v. Cushman, supra,
footnote 194 ; Brooks v, E. J. Willig Transport, supra, footnote 195 .
206 Battle v . Kilerease and Hallman v . Cushman, Wd.
'117 Supra, part 1 .
'211 Mortimore v . Wright 0 840), 6 M & W. 481 (Ex .) ; Bazeley v . Forder
(1868), L.R . 3 Q.B . 559, at p . 565 .
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reason behind this legislation is, of course, to see that dependant
meiAbers of a family are taken care of by the other members of
their family.who are able to do~ so . Much of the -motivation is also
the desire on the part of governments to minimize the 'size of their
welfare budgets by using the criminal law to force~ wayward fathers,
husbands and children to accord their children, Wives and parents
some degree of familial support that is not otherwise forthcoming.
The Canadian Criminal Code 109 provides that : "Everyone is
under a legal duty (a) as a parent . . . to provide necessaries of
life for a child under the age of sixteen years ; (b) as a husband to
provide necessaries of life for his wife ; and (c) to provide neces-
saries of life to a person under his charge if that person (i) is un-
able by reason of detention, age, illness, insanity or other cause,
to withdraw himself from that charge, and (ii) is unable to pro-
vide himself with necessaries of life." An offence is committed if
any of the above individuals fails, without lawful excuse, to per-
form that duty if the person to whom it is owed is destitute or the
failure to perform the duty endangers the life or the permanent
health of that person 211 and a penalty is provided for its breach .211
A similar section is found in the Ontario Children's Maintenance
Act, 212 which requires every parent to maintain and educate his
child under the age of sixteen years regard being hadto the station
in life and the means and ability of the child to maintain hiMSelf.218
ThePenal Code of California requires a father to furnish necessary
food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance to his cbild.214 Similar'
obligations are imposed on a husband toward a wife"' and on an
adult child toward his indigent parents.21, This article will focus
on the tort rights of these wives and children who become ill or
suffer aggravation of their illness as a result of the failure of the
husband or parent to supply food and shelter. Prosser suggests
that civil liability may be imposed in these cases since they re-
semble the obligation already imposed upon a jailer to his prisoner
and upon a school to its pUpil,217 but authority for this is at best
only scant. Broad statements may be found in cases to the effect
209 Supra, footnote is, s. 186(l) .
210 Ibid., s . 186(2) . 211 Ibid., s . 196(3) .
212 R.S.O ., 1960, c. 55 . Held intra vires in R . v. Kirkpatrick, [1959] O.R.539,19 D.L.R . (2d) 572.
'13 Ibid., s . 1 .
214 §270. , 215 §270(a).
216 §270(c). See also, California Civil Code, §§176, 196, 2065 242 and243 . Section 207 permits a third person to supply these necessaries where
a parent fails to do so and to sue the parents for the reasonable value
thereof.
211 op . cit., footnote 1, p . 338 .
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that "the provision of these necessaries is equally a civil obligation
. . . tas a criminal one]".218 General statements to the opposite
effect are also discoverable,-"' but no court appears to have faced
the issue of tort liability arising out of the breach of one of these
statutes . Part of the reason for the paucity of decisions is the marital
immunity which once prohibited a wife from suing her husband
which is now being abolished by statute and by various decisions."'
No such immunity from suit existed between parent and child in
English law, but, for some strange reason, the American courts
have created one which is only now beginning to give way.211
There are a few cases where parents sued third persons for ex-
penses incurred because of their statutory duty as parents. Parents
were entitled to recover the costs expended for the care of their
children who were injured by the defective wiring of the de-
fendant222 and by being run over by the defendant's dray.223 So too,
a mother was allowed to recover from her husband amounts re-
quired to support her children on the basis of this legislation.224
In one old case, however, a father was denied recovery for expenses
incurred when the defendant made his daughter pregnant, 225 and
at least one Canadian judge has suggested that no civil rights can
flow from a breach of the section in the Canadian Criminal
Code.221 There is another group of cases where third persons sued
parents for services or goods supplied to their children relying on
these criminal statutes . Although there is a tendency to deny re-
covery on the ground of a civil statutory duty, the courts have
found implied promises to pay on the part of these parents. 227
In the absence of any real authority one can only surmise
whether the courts will choose to advance the policy of these
statutes by imposing a civil duty to provide necessaries to specified
21,3 Algiers v. Tracey (1916), 30 D.L.R . 427 (Que .), where a conviction
was upheld for the failure to provide for a wife whose parents were looking
after her . See also Young v . Gravenhurst (1911), 24 O.L.R . 467, at p . 480
(C
A.) .
219 Childs v . Forfar (1921), 51 O.L.R . 210, at p . 216 ; St. Catherine's
Hospital v. Sviergula, [1961] O.R. 164, at p . 167 (Aylen J .) .
121 See Prosser, op . cit., footnote 1, p . 884 .
211 Ibid., p . 886 .
222 Young v . Gravenhurst, supra, footnote 218 .
121 Banks v. Shedden Forwarding Co . (1906), 11 O.L.R. 483 (C.A .) .
221 Feasey v . Fease.y. [194610.W. N. 145 (Master) .
211 Griminell v. Wells (1844), 7 M & G. 103 3 (C.P .) .
226 Meredith J ., dissenting, in Banks v . Shedden Forwarding Co., supra,
footnote 223, at p . 492, and in Childs v. Forfar, supra, footnote 219, at p . 211 .
See also, Aylen J . in St . Catherine's Hospital v . Sviergula, supro, footnote
219 .
227 See Vernon Jubilee Hospital v . Pound, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 813 ; St .
Catherine's Hospital v . Sviergula, ibid., Childs v . Forfar, ibid. See, also,
Baseley v . Forder,supria, footnote 208 .
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relatives or whether the courts will refrain from tampering with
the common law. It is suggested that as the family immunities
disappear, and the social problems attendant on broken homes
expand and as government welfare costs continue to increase, the
courts will begin to create tort duties for failure to comply with
this legislation. Since there is no problem of selection, since the
lack of action here is so morally reprehensible to virtually every-
one, and, since support can be provided without, any physical
danger, the eventual imposition of a tort duty appears-inevitable.
The presence of the criminal statute will facilitate and, hasten that
development .
4 . Abutter ordinances.
The requirement to clear ice and snow and to repair sidewalks
abutting their property is frequently placed upon property owners
by municipal ordinances or by-laws. These enactments normally
impose a small fine for failure to comply and. often provide that
upon notice to the owner the work may be done by the munici-
pality and. the cost may be charged to the owner. The breach
of this criminal legislation has not given rise to a new tort duty
of positive action in the absence of express language to the con-
trary"' anywhere except in West Virginia.221 An abutting property
owner is not made civilly liable for criminal failure to clear snow
or ice from the public sidewalk in front of his property, unless,
by some positive act, he has injured someone.230 In so holding,
most courts have said that the primary purpose .of these ordinances
is to reduce the cost to the municipality of keeping their streets
in repair,'and that the protection of the pedestrian is only a by-
product of these enactments .231
The leading Canadian case is Commerford v. Board of School
Commissioners ofRalifaX,232 where a by-law of the City of Halifax
requiring abutters to clear ice 'and snow from the adjoining side
walks was broken . In deciding that there was no civil liability
created by this breach, the court remarked about the absence in
the by-law of any intention to confer civil liability.113 The court
pointed out. that, since the by-law contained a provision creating
228 Willis V. Parker, supra, footnote 108 ; Texas Co . v. Grant, supra,
footnote 108 ... 221 Rich v. Rosenshine (1947), 131 W. Va . 30, 45 S.E . 2d 499 ; Barniak
v. Grossman (1956), 141 W. Va. 760, 93 S.E . 2d 49 .
210 Restatement of the Law of Torts, §288 ; Morris, loc. cit., footnote
21, at p . 147 .
24 King v . Crosbie Inc., (1942), 91 OkI. 525, 131 P.2d 105 .
232 Supra, footnote 17 . 23t Ibid.,- at p . 214 .
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civil liability for the breach of certain sections in the act, none
would be imposed for the breach of any other sections of the
by-law without a clear statutory direction to that effect. The muni-
cipality had not been empowered to create liability"' and the
inadequacy of the penalty evinced a legislative benevolence toward
homeowners rather than the intention to impose additional civil
sanction ."' Relying on Thayer's article, 236 the Nova Scotia court
refused to create a civil duty toward pedestrians on the basis
of the by-law, which decision has not been challenged .237
A similar approach has been taken by the American courts
which have held, generally, that no intention to confer a civil cause
of action is evinced by the ordinance . They invoke the strict rules
for statutory interpretation and say something like "If it had been
the intention of the Legislature to cast upon property owners . - -
the primary duty of keeping the streets reasonably safe . . . it
doubtless would have found apt words to create such a duty","'
or they may say "The court is to go no faster and no farther than
the Legislature has gone". 219 Another favourite device of the court
is to say that the statute created a public duty only and did not
create any private duty to individual pedestrians .210 Sometimes,
it is said, that the statute was meant only an as aid to the city in
performing its primary duty of snow removal, 241 or that the owner
was no more the cause of the injury than the pedestrian himself.242
But these statements are specious, and merely disguise the true
reasons for decision of which several valid ones exist. One reason
for the refusal to expand tort liability here is that these criminal
duties are imposed by inferior legislating bodies which are dis-
trusted by the courts .113 This is evidenced in the treatment by some
courts of ordinance breaches as mere evidence of negligence where-
as they treat statutory breaches as negligence per se .244 In one case
234 .1bld., at p . 216. 236 Ibid., at p . 218 . 211 Loc. cit., footnote 21 .
237 Hagen v. Goldfarb (1961), 28 D.L.R . 2d 746 (N.S.S.C.) . Liability was
imposed for positive negligence and nuisance, however.
238 Stevens v. Nelligon (1933), 116 Conn. 307, at p . 312, 164 Ad . 661,
at p . 663 .
219 Howard v . Howard (1921), 120 Me. 479, at p. 480, 115 Atl . 259, at
p . 260 ; Willoughby v . Cit), of New Haven (1935), 123 Conn . 446, 197 Ad. 85 .
240 Clark v . Stoudt (1944), 73 N.D . 165, 12 N.W. 2d 708 ; King v .
Crosbie, supra, footnote 231, at p. 108
,
'protect public at large" ; Rees v .
Cobb & Mitchell Co. (1930), 131 Ore. 665, 283 Pac . 1115 "duty to city",
at p . 1116 .
211 Western Auto Supply v . Phelan (1939),104 F.2d 85 (9th Cir .) ; King'v.
Crosbie, ibid., at p . 108 .
212 Clark v. Stoudt, supra, footnote 240, at p . 710 (N.W.) .
243 See Alexander, loc . cit., footnote 21, at p . 258 .
244 See Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 1, p. 203 ; Sellers v. Cline (1946), 160
Pa Super . 85, at p . 86, 49 A.2d 873, at p . 874 .
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a statute imposed civil liability on anyone who caused injury to
another while in breach of any other statute, but the court held
that itmould not be applied to a breach of an ordinance rather than
a statute. 211, Implicit in this distrust of municipalities, is the fear of
unwise laws being passed, loss of uniformity of the common law
from one town to the next and other such gnawing doubts.
Moreover, the courts probably do not sympathize with the
policy of these ordinances . Insofar as they diminish the cost and
expense of municipal government alone, the courts do not object
to the passage of these ordinances,211 but they do not favour the
transfer of the primary burden of road care from municipalities
to thousands of individuals who may or may not exercise the
responsibility adequately . "Responsibility would be divided to the
detriment of the public service . . . " 14 1 and the "Municipality
would relax its care and supervision","s they proclaim . As long
as the city is enlisting property owners as deputy street commis-
sioners to assist it in its primary responsibility, the court will not
object,"' however, it is a different matter when the municipality
attempts to relieve itself of this responsibility.
There is also the feeling of unfairness toward the abutter who
is not only made to tend the sidewalks on behalf of the municipality,
but to bear a civil obligation to anyone injured by his failure to
do so .110 In addition, there is the prevailing judicial opposition to
new tort obligations and departures from time-worn practices .
Since at common law abutters were not obligated to care for the
sidewalk, a criminal municipal ordinance should not change that
without clearly so stating. That would be to effect too "radical
a change" "I which "would add greatly to common law liabil-
ities" 111, and might lead to civil obligations that would be "form-
idable". 253
There is no urgency to create liability here in order to com-
pensate the injured person because the cases are very often contests
to resolve which of two defendants will bear the costs of these
245 Equitable Life v. McLellan (1941),286 Ky 17,149 S.W. 2d 730,
246 Ouelette v. Miller (1936), 134 Me. 162, 183 AtI . 341 ; Kirby v . Royl-
ston Market (1859), 80 Mass . 249, 74 Am. Dec. 682 ; Willoughby v. City
of New Haven, supra, footnote 239 .
2'7 Equitable Life v . McLellan, supra, footnote 245, at p . 753 (S.W.).
248 Ibid.
249 See Clark v . Stoudt, supra, footnote 240 .
250 Grooms v. Union Guardian Trust Co., (1944), 309 Mich . 437, 15 N.W.
2d 698 ; Taggart v . Bouldin (1933), 111 N.J.L . 464, 168 Ad . 570 .
"I Willoughby v. City of New Haven, supra, footnote 239, at p . 89 (AtI .) .
252 Grooms V. Union , Guardian Trust Co., supra, footnote 250, at p . 729
(N.W.) .
. . . Willoughby v . City ofNew Haven, supra, footnote 239, at p . 89 (Atl .) .
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accidents on the sidewalk, rather than to decide whether they will
be borne by anyone .254
In conclusion, although the courts disguise the true reasons
for their decisions with talk of intention and public duties, sound
policy reasons justify their virtually unanimous refusal to create
a new tort duty on the basis of breach of an abutter ordinance, .
The prevailing judicial opinion that the power of municipalities
should be kept in check, that dissipation of responsibility for
the care of sidewalks should be avoided, and the general reluctance
to open new areas of tort liability will probably perpetuate this
position. The countervailing policy pulls are not compelling, since
the municipality is usually available for suit if the abutter is not.
Nor is the conduct ofthe abutter in the least morally shocking . How-
ever-, these cases do not support the general principle that Thayer
derives from them to the effect that courts should never follow
the criminal law to create new duties .211 In the abutter cases there
just is no compelling reason for them to do so as there is in other
cases . 256
5. Other legislation.
There are many other assorted instances where courts have
used criminal legislation to advance into new areas of tort liability .
One very striking example of this proclivity was Pine Grom Poul-
tr~y Farin v. Newtown,251 where the defendant negligently manu-
factured feed which killed the plaintiff's ducks. The court relied
on a criminal statute which outlawed the sale of defective feed to
create a new manufacturers duty in property damage cases, which
had not yet been recognized at that time . Prior to the Neivtoivn218
case, manufacturers owed a duty to prevent only personal in-
juries . 211 Soon afterwards, the court discarded the legislative crutch
and held manufacturers liable for property damage without in-
voking the statutory violation. 210 Another such case is Frankstoll
v. Cohen,"' where an Australian court relied to some degree upon
"'In the Willoughby case, ibid., for example, the defendant bank was
relieved of responsibility on the basis of the abutter ordinance, but the
city was held liable. Sometimes municipalities are relieved of civil liability
on the basis of the immunity, but often, a statutory liability is expressly
created.
"I Thayer, loc. cit., footnote 21, at p . 329 .
251 Morris, loc. cit., footnote 21, at p . 148, in Studies, op . cit ., footnote
25 .
2,57 (1928), 248 N.Y. 293, 162 N .E . 84 . 258 Ibid.
151 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co . (1916), 217 N.Y . 382, 111 N.E . 1050 .
210 Genesee County Patrons v . Sonneborn Sons, Inc . (1934), 263 N.Y .
463, 189 N.E . 551 .
161 (1959-60), 102 C.L.R. 607 (H.C . Aust .) .
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a statutory duty in imposing liability for a negligent mis-statement
made by a municipal accountant prior to the celebrated Hedley,
Byrne v. Hellei-262 decision, which created this new duty in English
law without reliance on any statutory breach .
The Ontario courts have utilized legislation making it unlaw-
ful for animals to roam the highways to create a duty of care on
the part of their owners where at common law none existed.263
These cases accepted the view that no duty was owed at common
law, but manufactured a legislative intention to create civil lia-
bility .264 After the statute was amended in 1939 matters became
rather confused2ll until the Supreme
'
Court of Canada finally held
that a.duty to use reasonable care with regard to animals on modern
highways exists independently of any legislation .211
These cases demonstrate that the courts may use criminal legis-
lation as a crutch to expand the interests protected by tort law,
wherea more blatant exercise ofjudicial law-making powerappears
inadvisable. The statutory crutch may be discarded after it has
acted as a useful, if not an indispensable, tool .267
I Cases may be found where liability was imposed for criminally
failing to supply fire escapes on buildings 268 for neglecting to con-
vey children to school 211 and for the omission to remove a trolley
pole from , the highway in violation of legislation.270 Where as a
result of 'a breach of a car-locking ordinance the plaintiff was run
over by a thief who drove the trick away'271 where a public official
failed to submit a petition of right contrary to the statutory pro-
visions'7-1 and where the defendant refused to deliver a ballot to a
person with voting rights 273 civil responsibility was imposed. Where
a court is sympathetic to the policy of the statute and wishes to
262 [19641 A.C. 465.
263 Searle v . Wallbank, [1947] A.C . 341 .
261 Patterson v . Fanning, [19611 2 O.L.R . 462 (municipal by-law) ;
McMillan v. Wallace (1929), 64 O.L.R. 4, [1929] 3 D.L.R. 367 (C.A .) ;
Direct Transport Co . v . Corvell, [1938] O.R . 365, [1938] 3 D.L.R . 456 (C.A .) .
, 261 , Cf. Atkinson v . Fleming, [19561 O.R. 801, (1956), 5 D .L.R . (2d) 309
(C.A.), aff'd in [1959] S.C.R. 513, (1959) 18 D.L.R. (2d) 81 ; Noble v .
Calder, [19521 O.R . 577, [195213 D.L.R. 651 (C.A.) .
~ 211 Fleming v . Atkinson, ibid. There was some difference of opinion
among the members of the court . See Alexander, loc . cit ., footnote 21, at
p . 256, footnote 54 .
267 Morris, loc . cit., footnote 21, at p . 146 .
268 SolononS v. Gertzenstein Ltd., [1954] 2 Q.B . 243 ; Love v. Alew Fair-
view Corp . (1904), 10 B.C.R. 330 (C.A .) .
261 Riding v. Elmhurst School District, (19271 2 W.W.R. 159, [19271
3 D.L.R . 173 (Sask . C.A.) .
270 Simonsen v . Thorin (1931), 120 Neb . 684, 234 N.W . 628 .
271 Ross v. Hartman (1943), 78 App . D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14 (C.A.D.C.) .
272 Norton v . Fulton (1907), 39 S.C.R . 202, aff'd [19081 A.C . 451 (P.C.) .
273 Anderson v . Hicks (1902), 35 N.S.R . 161 (C.A .).
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advance that policy, it may create a newduty unless there are strong
contrary policies militating against this .
There are many cases where the courts have refrained from
following the criminal law and have abstained from imposing tort
liability for criminal non-feasance. Perhaps, the best known of
these cases is Cutler v. WandsTvorth Stadium'274 where a book-
maker was denied recovery against the defendant which failed to
provide him with adequate space for his endeavours at a dog-racing
track as required by the Betting and Lotteries Act. The House of
Lords barely veiled its disapproval of the policy of the statute,
at least insofar as it aided the bookmakers to increase their profits,
when Lord Simonds said that the statute is not "the charter of the
bookmakers". 271 The courts distinguished these statutes from those
which were passed to better the lot of workmen by placing new
duties upon employers for the benefit of their workmen.211 The
court concluded by proclaiming that the penalties provided were
'Geffective sanctions" and stood "in no need of aid from civil pro-
ceedings" .171 This decision contrasts markedly to that in Monk v.
Warbey,171 where the court desired to promote legislative policy.
Here no such desire was present for obvious reasons.
Other cases abound where the court held firm with the common
law and shunned expansion on the basis of criminal statutes . It
has been held that no tort action would lie for a breach of anti-
combines legislation in Canada,2" nor would an action for wages
lie on the basis of a criminal statute breach,"' and no action was
said to be maintainable by a criminal whose name was wrongfully
published contrary to an Identification of Criminals Act.211 In all
of these cases, the courts were unwilling to use the breach of
criminal statutes to create tort liability since the policies of the
statutes did not appear worthy of further advancement.
The fate of section 110(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada,2 a-'
which creates an offence if someone "omits, without reasonable
excuse, to assist a public officer or peace officer in the execution
of his duty in arresting a person or in preserving the peace, after
having reasonable notice that he is required to do so", is still un-
214 Supra, footnote 102 . 275 Ibid., at p . 404. 211 Ibid., at p . 413,
2117 fbid., at p . 414. See also Green v. Portsmouth, [19531 2 All E.R . 102
(C.A .) .
278 Supra, footnote 102 .
279 Transport Oil v. Imperial Oil, [19351 O.R . I 11, aff'd at p . 215 ; Bute
DuffC.J. in Philco Products v. Thertnionics Ltd., [1940] 4 D.L.R.. 1, at
P,
3 .
280 Outen v. Steivart, [193213 W.W.R. 193, 40 Man . R . 557 .
181 Pallan v . McLellan, (194612 D.L.R . 606 (B.C.H.C .) .
292 Stipl.a . footnote 18 .
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decided with regard to a civil duty . The fact that the Ontario Work-
mcn~s Compensation Act283 provides benefits to such a person as
an employee of the Crown may impede the creation of a new duty,
at least in Ontario, since it is not urgently required by the victims
who are looked after under this statutory scheme.
V11. The Limitations.
The courts have constructed a body of limiting principles so
as to prevent too wide a use of criminal legislation to create new
tort duties . These limitations resemble very closely their counter-
parts which Emit the operation of the legislation where it is used
to concretize specific standards of care .284
First, the failure to respond to the legislative dictates must
cause some harm to the person complaining.215 It will not do to
have people suing wrongdoers who -violate the criminal law if they
have suffered no harm as a result of that wrongdoing. Just as
negligence in the air will not do,116 neither will crime in the air.
If his failure to obey the hit and run statute did not contribute to
the death or further injury of the victim, the defendant will not be
held liable,187 as where the victim, died instantly or where others
took him immediately to the hospital.288 So too, where the neglect
to insure in violation of a statute did not contribute to the inability
of a victim to recover, no liability will be imposed.219 This will pre-
sumably be the case where someone falls on uncleared ice due to
his own negligence rather than to the breach of an abutter ordi-
nance, where the wife of the wayward husband d[les while being
cared for by her father or wherethe help of a summoned bystander
would have been of no avail in preventing injury to a police officer.
This is only an application of the fundamental negligence principle
which demands that offending conduct culminate in harm to the
plaintiff for an action to lie.
'283 R.S.O., 1960, C. 437, s. 122 .
284 See Fleming, op. cit., footnote 1, p . 133 ; Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 1,
p . 193.
285 See Daniels v. Vaux, supra, footnote 183 ; See, generally, Cole .
Windfall and Probability : A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law (1964),
52 Calif. L . Rev . 459 ; Hart and Honor6, Causation in The Law (1959) .
286 PaIsgrafv. Long Island R. Co. (1928), 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E . 99, per
Cardozo, C.J .
297 Boyer v. Gulf, CAS.F.R. Co . (1957), 306 S.W. 2d 215 (Tex . Civ .
App.) ; Hallman v. Cushman, supra, footnote 194 ; Brooks V. Willii Trans-
port Co., supra, footnote 195 ; But cf. language in Battle v . Kilcrease,
supra, footnote 190.
-188 People v . Scofield (1928), 203 Cal. 703, 265 Pac. 914 ; People v .
Martin (1931), 114 Cal. App. 337, 300, Pac . 108 .
211 Daniels v. Faux, supra, footnote 183 .
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Second, the harm that is caused must be of a kind which the
legislation was aimed at preventing . Only such harm which falls
within the scope of the risk contemplated by the provision is com-
pensable . 290 Gorris v. SCOtt291 is as applicable here as it is in negli-
gence per se cases. It will be recalled that in this case certain types
of pens were required to protect animals against disease. As a result
of a breach of this legislation, the sheep were swept overboard. No
liability was imposed, since the risk which culminated in the harm
was not the risk against whichthe legislation was directed. Although
this principle poses some problems, often due to judicial narrow-
sightedness . 29 1-1 it will doubtless be applied by the courts in these
creation of duty cases. Where a victim of an uninsured vehicle in
England fails to recover because he is unable to prove that the
driver was at fault, the fact that the driver committed a breach
of statute will aid him not. Nor will it assist the victim of a hit
and run violation if, while he lies helpless on the road, his enemy
appears and intentionally shoots hiM.293 So too, it Will not avail
a pedestrian who is run over on Sunday morning to point to a
breach by the driver of a Sunday Observance law, of a law requir-
ing tail-lights that function or of a licensing statute."' The Mas-
sachusetts "outlaw driver rule" will not likely be exported beyond
the borders of that great Commonwealth .215 The desire to inflict
additional punishment on criminal offenders, and to flush out
undiscovered wrongdoers will not outweigh the requirement that
the risk which culminates in the injury must and should be one
which the legislation was aimed at eliminating.
Third, the plaintiff must bring himself within the protective
legislative umbrella . If he is not one of those whom the criminal
statute attempted to protect, the tort court will be loath to give
him a civil cause of action . Because of this limitation, the courts
have refused to extend Monk v. Warbey, so as to allow a servant of
the uninsured owner to recover, because the legislation was de-
signed to protect third persons and not the employees of the
owner."' One may quarrel with this application of the doctrine
in specific instances, but, nevertheless, it will be utilized by the
courts to deny recovery to such people who may suffer a heart
I'll See, generally, Fleming, op . cit., footnote 1, p. 133 .
'291 (1874), L.R . 9 Ex. 125.
292 See Fleming, op . cit., footnote 1, p. 133.
291 Cf. if he is negligently hit again or if he is robbed.
211 See Fricke, loc . cit., footnote 21, at p. 253.
295 lbld.~
"I Semsex Ltd. v. Gladstone, supra, footnote 182- Gregory v. Ford,
supra, footnote 182.
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attack as a result of seeing a victim of ahit and run accident bleed
to death without help . The negligence per se cases will undoubtedly
be duplicated in this context and'-will probably demonstrate on
occasion the same lack of intelligent application.
The tort courts have in the past said that before they could rely
on a statute, it must be designed to protect a particular class of
people and not the general public .117 Sometimes the court stated
the issue in terms of whether the legislature intended to .create a
public duty alone or a duty to individuals as well . It has been in-
dicated by Lord Justice Atkin in Phillips v. Brittania Hygienic
Laundry,"" that "it would be strange if a less important duty which
is owed to a section of the public may be enforced by action, while
a more important duty owed to public cannot" . 119 More astute
courts have now held that as long as the plaintiff brings "himself
within the benefit of the act" he may rely on its breach .101 It ob-
viously cannot matter whether the statute was designed to benefit
a particular class or society as a whole, as long as the person claim-
ing the protection of the statute was someone whom the legislature
sought to protect."' Some statutes are broadly aimed and others
are more narrowly directed . The earlier test was merely an unhappy
verbal formulation of a rational limiting device, which resulted
largely from an over-rehance on the search for legislative inten-
tion. 1112 Both the unreal legislative intention test, as well as the related
public duty test, should be discarded.
The courts will therefore require that the conduct which violates
the criminal statute
,
cause damage to the plaintiff, that the harm
is one which the statute aimed at preventing, and that the plaintiff
is one of those to be benefitted by the enactment . They are, thus,
being consistent with their -use of statutes to fix safety standards,
which is understandable and desirable.
Conclusion
The courts have imposed tort liability for criminal nonfeasance,
giving some encouragement to Good Samaritans in several isolated
situations . The new legislation which creates criminal duties of
positive action has aided the courts to increase the number of
instances where there is a civil duty to render assistance to one's
fellow man. Unfortunately, in so doing the courts have disguised
297 See Fleming, op. cit ., footnote 1, p . 128 .
298 Supra, footnote 146 . 299 Ibid., at pp . 841-842 . Ibid.
"I See Commerford v . Board of School Commissioners, supra, footnote
17, at p . 212. See, also, Monk v. Warbey, supra, footnote 102 .
"I See Alexander, loc . cit ., footnote 21 .
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their deeds with discussion of the intention. of the legislature to
confer civil rights which in most cases has been an unreal quest for
a non-existent legislative intention leading to confusion rather than
to illumination. This meaningless pursuit should be abandoned
so that the real issues can be faced and resolved .
Any search for another theory to replace the intention theory
was doomed to failure since no one rationale, however brilliant, can
hope to resolve all the complex policy conflicts that are presented
in the cases . The theory proposed by Thayer 301 has proved too
rigid, although it has helped to nurture the negligence per se doc-
trine. The courts need various theories to assist them in their task .
Perhaps the best that can be offered is that the existence of a crim-
inal, statute requiring positive conduct should be a factor which
a court should consider when faced with a tort action based on the
offending conduct in addition to the other factors and policies
involved in the case .
Where the policy of the statute is considered important, the
courts may advance that policy by providing a civil remedy both as
compensation for the victim and as an extra deterrent to the wrong
doer. This is consistent with the notions of comity, democracy and
superior legislative expertise. Tile court tends to do this more
readily where the conduct of the defendant, as in the bit and run
cases, is worthy of strong moral condemnation, where there is a
likelihood of insurance availability, where the defendant may be
easily selected and where no physical danger to the defendant is
involved . The fact that a rescuer may recover damages should spur
further development. On the other hand, where the courts disap-
prove of the legislative policy, they will revert to their ancient
hostility toward statutes and refuse to extend the scope of their
operation beyond the creation of criminal responsibility.
Where the legislation in question is a municipal ordinance or
other subordinate legislation, the court is less likely to impose
civil liability for its breach. The prejudice of courts toward this
type of legislation, which is indicated elsewhere, militates against
its use for this purpose. Fears that the myriad variations will sub-
vert the commonness of the common law, lack of warning, the
possibility of politically influenced and ill-considered ordinances
and other considerations justify this view.
Always the courts will operate within the normal limitations
of tort law. The conduct must cause loss to the plaintiff, the risk
must be one which the legislation hoped to curtail and the plaintiff
303 Loc. cit., footnote 21 .
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must be within the group to be protected. These latter requirements
are due largely to a wise deference being paid to the legislative win.
That the court will not rely as readily on criminal legislation
to create a new duty as it will to fix the standard of care where a
duty already exists cannot be denied, since this is a more drastic
step for a court to take,3(14 but the courts have created new tort
duties by analogy to criminal legislation and it is submitted that
such steps are proper and justified if done with discretion and can-
dour,115 Thayer, Gregory, Williams and Fleming notwithstanding.
101 Alexander, loc. cit., footnote 21 .
305 Wright, Note (1941), 19 Can. Bar Rev. 51, at p . 52 ; Alexander, loc.
cit ., ibid., at p . 276 ; Morris, loc. cit., footnote 21 .
